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A Killer Flu?

Scientific Experts Estimate that “Inevitable” Major
Epidemic of New Influenza Virus Strain Could Result in
Millions of Deaths if Preventive Actions Are Not Taken
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he seasonal flu kills approximately 36,000 to 40,000 people and hospitalizes more than 200,000 in the United States each year.1 Annually,

influenza costs the national economy over $10 billion in lost productivity and
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Recently, however, health experts worldwide
have been sounding the alarm about a different type of flu. They warn of the “inevitable”
emergence of a new, severe strain of the flu
virus against which people have no immunity
to protect them.3 This could result in a rapidly
spreading, worldwide epidemic of this new
potentially lethal strain of the disease, which
scientists refer to as a “pandemic.”4 New strains
of the flu traditionally emerge in animals, often
in poultry and pigs, and then as the disease
develops over time, it can become transmitted
to humans. The severity of an emerging pandemic would be determined by the particular
strain of the new form of the virus and how easily contagious it proves to be in humans.
The World Health Organization (WHO),
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), and other health authorities believe
that the emergence of a pandemic flu could
be devastating to world health and economic stability.

I In the U.S., projection models predict that
a pandemic may cause over a half a million
deaths and two million hospitalizations.5
I The estimated economic impact of a pandemic flu outbreak in the U.S. today,
based on projections from the relatively
mild 1968 flu epidemic, would be $71.3 to
$166.5 billion due to death and lost productivity, excluding other “disruptions to
commerce and society.”6
The U.S. would be impacted by the global
implications as soon as a pandemic outbreak occurred in any part of the world due
to the interdependence of economies.
Sectors, such as hospitals and the health
care system, which rely on supplies manufactured in other parts of the world, including Asia, would feel immediate repercussions and supply shortages. Travel restrictions, possible limitations on public gatherings and events, and other measures taken
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to limit the spread of disease would also
have rapid and far reaching repercussions.
Since a pandemic could likely result in political and economic destabilization, particularly in developing countries, it poses serious national security concerns for the U.S.
Based on historical trends and projections,
virologists and epidemiologists predict a
new flu pandemic will emerge three to four
times each century.8 Health officials around
the world are troubled by the severity of the
“avian flu” circulating in Asia, which scientists refer to as the H5N1 flu strain. They
fear this avian flu could become the next
pandemic for humans. The regional director of the WHO for the Western Pacific
region stated in February 2005 that the
“world is now in the gravest possible danger
of a pandemic.”9

I As of June 17, 2005, this "bird flu" virus
has killed 54 individuals and has spread
rapidly among bird populations.10
I As of April 2005, the strain seems to be
exhibiting a mortality rate of over 50 percent in humans. Experts are concerned
that when the mortality rate decreases,
the virus’s transmission rate will increase.
I Health officials are concerned that the
avian virus could become more contagious among humans, and that it could
remain in a strain against which humans
have no natural resistance.
I CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, the Asian
investment banking arm of Crédit Agricole
of France, estimates that avian influenza
has already cost the impacted region in
Asia $8 to $12 billion, mostly from lost revenue from poultry and related industries.11

“

I AM ACUTELY AWARE OF THE DISASTER THAT A PANDEMIC COULD CAUSE.
MANY OF US ARE PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT H5N1 AVIAN INFLUENZA VIRUS,
AND WE’RE RIGHT TO WORRY. IT HAS INFECTED AT LEAST 89 HUMAN BEINGS
AND KILLED MORE THAN HALF. THERE IS A CHANCE THAT THIS VIRUS COULD CAUSE

”

THE NEXT PANDEMIC12

– U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt, May 16, 2005

MAJOR FLU OUTBREAKS OF THE 20TH CENTURY13
1918 – The “Spanish” flu pandemic killed
500,000 in the U.S., 50 million worldwide.

triggering global concern until all samples
were accounted for and destroyed.14

1957–58 – An outbreak spread from
China across the globe, killing approximately 70,000 in the U.S. In April 2005, a
company testing laboratory proficiency
mistakenly distributed samples of this pandemic strain to laboratories worldwide,

1968–69 – The “Hong Kong” flu, the most
recent pandemic, affected millions worldwide and disrupted world economies.
1997 – The first identification of the avian
“bird” flu, which remains active in Asia.15

“

SINCE JANUARY 2004, EVENTS AFFECTING BOTH HUMAN AND ANIMAL HEALTH HAVE BROUGHT
THE WORLD CLOSER TO AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE 1968. WHEREAS PAST PANDEMICS HAVE CONSISTENTLY ANNOUNCED THEMSELVES WITH AN EXPLOSION OF CASES, EVENTS DURING
2004, SUPPORTED BY EPIDEMIOLOGICAL AND VIROLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE, HAVE GIVEN THE WORLD AN
UNPRECEDENTED WARNING THAT A PANDEMIC MAY BE IMMINENT. THEY ALSO HAVE OPENED AN UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITY TO ENHANCE PREPAREDNESS.

”

– Report by the WHO Secretariat, April 200516
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While experts predict a pandemic flu is
“inevitable,” subsequent deaths in the United
States predicted to be over a half million people are not. Increasing federal leadership,
converting national and state pandemic
influenza plans into operational blueprints,
procuring adequate antiviral medication for
treatment, and putting a process in place
now for rapid influenza vaccine approval are
all steps that should be taken immediately.
Protecting the U.S. and the world against the
threat of a pandemic would, at the same time,
better prepare countries for threats posed by
infectious illnesses, including the intentional
spread of disease by terrorists. The threat of a
pandemic influenza outbreak was highlighted
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) as one of 15 disaster planning scenarios for which the U.S. should be prepared.
In order to help understand the current status of U.S. preparations and highlight ways to
improve them, in the following report, Trust
for America’s Health (TFAH) provides:
I A state-by-state examination of potential
deaths and hospitalizations due to a flu
pandemic based on model estimates;
I A state-by-state examination of capacity
to treat citizens with recommended
antivirals based on model estimates;
I A review of U.S. and state pandemic
readiness, including a comparison to
other nations’ progress; and

“

I Recommendations for improved pandemic
readiness.
Overall, the report finds:
I Despite the health and economic
implications of such an event, pandemic
planning efforts are lagging in the U.S.,
especially when compared to the United
Kingdom and Canada.
I The U.S. has not assessed or planned for
the disruption a flu pandemic could
cause both to the economy and society as
a whole. This includes daily life considerations, such as potential school and
workplace closures, potential travel and
mass transit restrictions, and the potential need to close stores resulting in complications in the delivery of food and
basic supplies to people. Daily life and
economic problems would likely emerge
in the U.S. even before the pandemic flu
hit the country due to the global interdependence of the world economy.
I Aspects of the planning process, such as
ensuring vaccine and antiviral capabilities and surge capacity readiness, are
incomplete or fragmented.
I The failure to establish a cohesive, rapid,
and transparent U.S. pandemic strategy
could prove a major weakness against a
virulent and efficient virus -- putting
Americans needlessly at risk.

I would like to emphasize that although we cannot be certain exactly when the next

influenza pandemic will occur, we can be virtually certain that one will occur and that the resulting
morbidity, mortality, and economic disruption would present extraordinary challenges to public

”

health authorities around the world.

– Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National
Institutes of Health, Department of Health and Human Services 17

“

Today, many influenza experts, including those at CDC, consider the threat of a serious
influenza pandemic to the United States to be high. Although the timing and impact of an influenza
pandemic is unpredictable, the occurrence is inevitable and potentially devastating.
– Dr. Julie Gerberding, Director, CDC18

”
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Model Estimates of the Impact of a Severe-Strain Flu Virus Epidemic
In order to illustrate the potential severity of a
pandemic outbreak in the U.S., the chart
below uses one model based on assumptions
from the current avian flu outbreak.
Scientists have used a number of different
models to estimate the scope and impact of
the emergence of a new strain of the flu. The
basic U.S. planning model is based on
assumptions from the 1968 “Hong Kong”
pandemic flu, which was considered to be relatively mild. Experts also have predicted
higher and lower estimates based on different
sets of assumptions. The numbers below
adapt the model to reflect moderate assumptions for the current avian flu threat.
1. The WHO has estimated that there would
be a “contraction” rate of 25 percent for
this flu strain. This means they warn that
countries should be prepared for approximately 25 percent of their populations to
get sick from the pandemic virus. Other
scientists have estimated that up to 50
percent of countries’ populations could
become infected.

2. The current strain of the avian flu is
viewed as significantly more lethal than the
1968 pandemic flu strain. A high-level
pandemic, such as the 1918 pandemic, is
considered to be six times more lethal
than the 1968 flu.19 The projections below
reflect a mid-level estimate of a three times
higher rate. These numbers are reflected
in the “Projected Dead” column in the
table below. The range of estimates, from
low level to high level severity death rates,
can be found in Appendix A.
3. Due to the severity of the avian flu strain,
experts also believe that it would result in a
much higher hospitalization rate than estimates using the 1968 strain. The estimates
below, in the “Projected Hospitalizations”
column, reflect a mid-level estimate of a
three times higher rate. A more virulent
strain of flu, changes in medical care and
treatment procedures, and an aged population are all factors behind this projection.
The range of estimates, from low level to
high level severity hospitalization rates, can
be found in Appendix A.

POTENTIAL IMPACT: STATE BY STATE ANALYSIS
To assist state and local health agencies with pandemic readiness, CDC developed a computer model
(FluAid 2.0) that generates mortality, hospitalization, and outpatient rates for different age populations on a state-by-state basis.20 FluAid derives its default numbers from the 1968 Hong Kong pandemic, which had a relatively minor impact on the U.S. According to Dr. Keiji Fukuda, the Chief of
Epidemiology and Surveillance Section, Influenza Branch at CDC’s National Center for Infectious
Diseases, a high severity pandemic, similar to the 1918 pandemic outbreak, may have a mortality rate
of six times the 1968 pandemic.21 To estimate the potential impact from a H5N1 pandemic on the
U.S., the following projections multiplied the default FluAid mortality rate for each state and each age
group by three (the mid-point between the default numbers and the possible six times mortality
rate); hospitalization rates are also three times the default FluAid number.
Projections of deaths and hospitalizations from an H5N1 pandemic are only estimates.
Variables including the virulence of the virus, its attack rate, and the success of preventative
and controlling measures (including the use of antiviral medication and the development of a
vaccine) would influence the actual total. While the mortality estimate provided below -- a
U.S. death toll over a half a million persons -- varies from some other experts’ forecasts, all
projections agree on a critical point: the risk of a pandemic is serious enough to justify urgent
steps to improve U.S. ability to fight this virus if it starts to spread.
It is also important to note that planning and accommodating for the surge of sick patients presents
a separate, massive challenge to the health care system -- a consideration that the projected death
toll should not overshadow. The impact of over two million hospitalized patients would test and possibly overwhelm the surge capacity of hospitals nationwide. For instance, according to the American
Hospital Association, in 2003 there are only 965,256 staffed hospital beds in registered hospitals.22
4

TABLE 1: Potential Pandemic Influenza Deaths and Hospitalizations
From a Mid-level Pandemic Flu*
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
U.S. Totals

Projected Dead

Projected Hospitalized

Number of Cases

8,886
886
9,223
5,350
60,875
7,192
7,054
1,507
1,155
35,737
13,655
2,446
2,279
23,720
11,817
6,233
5,373
7,930
8,334
2,651
9,958
13,136
19,622
9,304
5,362
11,274
1,804
3,441
3,243
2,333
16,980
3,244
37,701
14,987
1,371
23,197
6,833
6,724
27,185
2,234
7,474
1,559
10,875
35,124
3,393
1,185
13,104
10,910
4,049
10,620
915
541,433

38,591
4,558
39,675
22,660
273,090
32,978
29,932
6,560
4,974
142,386
62,912
10,571
10,157
103,738
51,711
26,090
22,946
34,748
37,148
11,333
44,500
56,038
86,005
40,786
23,531
48,240
7,787
14,697
14,455
10,301
72,791
14,504
162,490
65,637
5,795
99,979
29,376
29,047
112,658
9,263
32,983
6,599
47,678
160,648
15,906
5,213
58,872
48,610
17,014
45,842
4,086
2,358,089

1,079,789
152,328
1,138,742
630,705
8,067,075
973,161
817,465
182,895
132,241
3,663,486
1,871,561
296,651
302,558
2,973,962
1,466,027
713,106
654,335
977,031
1,087,942
310,513
1,273,572
1,529,313
2,443,473
1,171,387
682,625
1,350,515
219,703
414,218
419,202
293,177
2,013,212
432,438
4,534,307
1,856,296
160,221
2,796,583
829,273
810,872
3,004,915
246,857
940,045
184,493
1,342,050
4,859,834
514,787
147,245
1,683,499
1,402,591
453,947
1,292,419
119,936
66,914,573

* Projections are based on CDC’s FluAid 2.0 program. The estimated deaths are for a pandemic strain three times more
lethal than the 1968 pandemic, on which the default FluAid numbers are based. The hospitalization rate is three times
the default 1968 rate. The Dead and Hospitalized numbers represent the most likely FluAid projection at a 25% rate of
contraction. The Number of Cases is the projected number of residents contracting the flu, based on a 25% rate of contraction. State population numbers are from FluAid, using U.S. Census data gathered in 1999. Updated population data
were not used to ensure consistency with estimated Dead and Hospitalized numbers.

As of May 2005, the U.S. has stockpiled 2.3
million courses of the antiviral medication
Tamiflu, which could be used as a treatment
in the event of an outbreak, and intends to
order approximately three million more with
funds recently appropriated by Congress to
total 5.3 million. The WHO is currently estimating that an avian flu epidemic could
impact 25 percent of countries’ populations.

In the U.S., this means it could affect nearly
67 million individuals, based on FluAid projections and population numbers. With the
current level of the U.S. Tamiflu order, over
61.5 million Americans who could be infected
would not receive antiviral medication. If the U.S.
orders additional courses of Tamiflu, they
would not be available until 2007, unless production capacity significantly changes.
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In an actual pandemic, there would likely be
geographic concentrations of the disease,
especially in the initial stages of an outbreak.
U.S. government officials may decide to
“front-end” target the limited supply geographically in hopes of containing the initial
spread. However, it is likely that the pan-

demic would still spread to the remainder of
the country. As a result of the pandemic’s
national scope and lacking a prioritized distribution plan, these projections assume that
the U.S. would use proportional distribution
(based on population) in delivering the
remaining Tamiflu courses.

TABLE 2: State-by-State Capacity to Treat Citizens with
Recommended Antiviral*
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
U.S. Totals

Number of Tamiflu
Courses Available

Number of Cases

Number of Cases
Without Tamiflu

85,525
12,065
90,195
49,955
638,956
77,080
64,748
14,486
10,474
290,168
148,238
23,496
23,964
235,554
116,117
56,482
51,827
77,386
86,171
24,594
100,874
121,130
193,536
92,780
54,068
106,968
17,402
32,808
33,203
23,221
159,457
34,251
359,142
147,029
12,690
221,505
65,683
64,225
238,006
19,552
74,457
14,613
106,298
384,925
40,774
11,663
133,342
111,093
35,955
102,367
9,500
5,300,000

1,079,789
152,328
1,138,742
630,705
8,067,075
973,161
817,465
182,895
132,241
3,663,486
1,871,561
296,651
302,558
2,973,962
1,466,027
713,106
654,335
977,031
1,087,942
310,513
1,273,572
1,529,313
2,443,473
1,171,387
682,625
1,350,515
219,703
414,218
419,202
293,177
2,013,212
432,438
4,534,307
1,856,296
160,221
2,796,583
829,273
810,872
3,004,915
246,857
940,045
184,493
1,342,050
4,859,834
514,787
147,245
1,683,499
1,402,591
453,947
1,292,419
119,936
66,914,573

994,263
140,263
1,048,547
580,749
7,428,119
896,081
752,717
168,409
121,767
3,373,318
1,723,323
273,154
278,594
2,738,408
1,349,910
656,624
602,508
899,645
1,001,771
285,918
1,172,698
1,408,183
2,249,937
1,078,607
628,558
1,243,546
202,301
381,409
385,999
269,956
1,853,755
398,186
4,175,165
1,709,267
147,530
2,575,078
763,590
746,646
2,766,910
227,305
865,589
169,880
1,235,752
4,474,909
474,013
135,582
1,550,157
1,291,498
417,992
1,190,053
110,436
61,614,573

* Tamiflu availability projections are based on state-by-state proportional distribution of the 5.3 million courses of Tamiflu
ordered or currently in U.S. federal government possession. For example, California, with approximately 12% of the U.S. population, receives 12% of the Tamiflu in the above projection. The Number of Cases is the projected number of residents contracting the flu, based on a 25% rate of contraction. State population numbers are from FluAid, using U.S. Census data
gathered in 1999. Updated population data were not used to ensure consistency with estimated Dead and Hospitalized
numbers. The Number of Cases Without Tamiflu is the difference between the other two columns.
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U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services Draft Pandemic Plan

“

BEYOND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, WE NEED A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH
THAT INCLUDES FAR MORE THAN DRAFTING OF GENERAL PLANS, AS SEVERAL COUNTRIES
AND STATES HAVE DONE. WE NEED A DETAILED OPERATIONAL BLUEPRINT OF THE BEST
WAY TO GET THROUGH 12 TO 24 MONTHS OF A PANDEMIC.23

”

– Dr. Michael Osterholm, Director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy

In August 2004, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) released a
draft plan of U.S. strategy to deal with a flu pandemic. The plan, an updated version of a 1978
plan, outlines proposed collaboration among
jurisdictions, as well as preparedness and
response guidelines for federal, state, and local

health officials. The goals of the plan are to 1)
decrease the burden of disease; 2) minimize
social disruption; and 3) reduce economic
impact.24 The draft plan is accessible on the
HHS Web site at www.dhhs.gov/nvpo/pandemics.25 Related public comments on the
plan were accessible at the site in March 2005.

Questions for U.S. Pandemic Planning Efforts
I Is There Coordination Among Government,
Health, and Economic Infrastructures?
State, federal, and international efforts must
be coordinated, with instructions for specific
implementation. Sufficient resources must
be allocated to match what is needed to carry
out the plan.
I Does the National Strategic Stockpile
Include ALL Necessary Medical Supplies
That Will Be Necessary to Respond to a
Pandemic? In addition to stockpiling antivirals and vaccines, when they are available,
the U.S. must also stockpile critical medical
supplies such as masks, gloves, gowns, bed
linens, and all other equipment needed to
assure that hospitals and other health care
providers are properly protected when the
usual supply chain is disrupted either
abroad or in the U.S.
I Are There Sufficient Surge Capacity
Capabilities? A pandemic or other massemergency scenario would overwhelm the
normal operations of hospitals and the
health care system. Readiness efforts must
account for massive demand triggered by a
pandemic. Local health officials and first
responders must be included in planning

efforts to maximize the on-the-ground ability to “scale up” capability in a rapid manner.
I Is There a Prioritization of Who Would
Receive Antivirals and Vaccines Based on
a Limited Supply? Specific national guidance must be established on vaccine prioritization, including developing guidelines
on the use of antiviral drugs and lists of
priority groups for vaccine receipt and distribution, given that there is likely to be
insufficient supplies during a pandemic.
I Is There a Rapid Response Plan to Develop,
Test, and Produce a Vaccine? It will take an
estimated six to nine months after a pandemic emerges to develop a vaccine. Questions of
how to rapidly review and test the vaccine
once it is created remain, including concerns
about speeding the approval process by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), liability protection for vaccine manufacturers, and
what type of preservative will be used in the
vaccine. In addition, industry representatives
have suggested that current production
capacity is insufficient to meet the demand
for a pandemic influenza vaccine, and that it
could take 12-18 months to meet appropriate
production levels.26
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I Is There Clear Assignment of Who in the
Government Would Control and
Distribute Vaccine and Treatments? Do
plans exist to stockpile stopgap antiviral
medications and vaccines, based on the
small supplies of drugs that will be available versus the expected need and
demand? As was evident in the 2004 flu
season in the U.S. when there was a shortage of available vaccine for the annual flu,
there is no centralized infrastructure to
control and monitor vaccine distribution.
I Are There Clear Plans to Communicate
and Inform the Public? Effective response
to a pandemic would require a clear

action plan for what information would
be made available to the public and on
what time frame.
I Are There Coordinated Plans for
Monitoring Outbreak and Managing
Containment? Coordinating containment
efforts requires sufficient surveillance and
tracking systems to monitor and detect outbreaks, infected persons, and the vaccine
supply, as well as the ability to examine the
readiness of infected survivors to re-enter
the workplace. Survivors as a volunteer
workforce would prove essential to helping
combat the pandemic, because they will
have developed immunity to the virus.

RECENTLY, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN SEVERAL NOTABLE
STEPS TO BEGIN TO PREPARE FOR A POTENTIAL PANDEMIC.
I Congress has been increasingly concerned about the nation’s readiness to respond to
pandemic and annual influenza. Since convening in January, the 109th Congress has held
a series of hearings on issues related to influenza, including:
L May 26, 2005, “The Threat of and Planning for Pandemic Flu,” House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, Health Subcommittee.
L May 4, 2005, “The State of Readiness for the 2005-2006 Flu Season,” House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations.
L April 12, 2005, “Pandemic Preparedness and Influenza Vaccine Supply -- CDC, NIAID and
the Office of the Secretary of HHS,” House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee
on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies.
L February 10, 2005, “The Perplexing Shift from Shortage to Surplus: Managing This Season’s Flu
Shot Supply and Preparing for the Future,” House Committee on Government Reform.
I In May 2005, Congress passed supplemental appropriations legislation that made available
$25 million “for a coordinated program to prevent and control the spread of the avian
influenza virus.”27 In addition, $58 million was appropriated for the purchase of influenza
countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile. These funds are expected, in part,
to be used to order an additional three million courses of Tamiflu, to bring the U.S. stockpile order up to 5.3 million courses of treatment.
I In April 2005, U.S. Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) introduced the AVIAN Act of 2005, proposed legislation that includes a mandate for the federal government to stockpile the antiviral
medication oseltamivir, commonly known as Tamiflu.28
I In April 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush approved use of quarantine in the event of an
outbreak of “influenza caused by novel or reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or
have the potential to cause, a pandemic,” which includes, but is not limited to the H5N1 strain
of avian flu currently in Southeast Asia.29
I In April 2005, the U.S. Department of State issued an advisory statement about the avian flu
and announced it is taking measures to support the World Health Organization’s (WHO)
efforts to contain the outbreak.30
I In March 2005, in the U.S. Department of State authorization bill (S.600), the U.S. Senate proposed
including $25 million for International Famine and Disaster Assistance to prevent and respond to a
possible outbreak of the avian flu and called for a task force to coordinate U.S. policy.31
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“

‘WE REMAIN VERY VULNERABLE,’ SUMMARIZED ENERGY AND COMMERCE
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN JOE L. BARTON [(R-TEXAS)]. ‘THINK OF IT LIKE THIS -- A
BAD FLU OUTBREAK COULD KILL MORE AMERICANS THAN EITHER OR BOTH OF THE
LAST CENTURY’S WORLD WARS.’32
State Pandemic Readiness
Similar questions can be asked about the level
of preparedness of state and local governments
for a pandemic. America’s public health system relies on a loosely affiliated network of
approximately 3,000 federal, state, and local
health agencies often working with private sector and professional health organizations.
State governments have primary responsibility
for the health of their citizens under U.S. law.
Therefore, a federal plan without ready-toimplement state plans would be insufficient.
Most states have developed draft pandemic
response plans, but they are in widely differ-

”

ent phases of readiness. A recent examination found that only between 25-30 states have
made their plans publicly available.33 Making
the plans publicly available is considered by
many experts as an essential feature of pandemic readiness in order to improve integration with other jurisdictions as well as to add a
level of accountability. In fact, in commenting on the draft U.S. pandemic influenza preparedness plan, the WHO stated, “We feel
that in order to ensure broad commitment
for the plan, it is essential to involve the community in the planning process.”34

CITY AND LOCAL PLANNING: ON-THE-GROUND AND FACING
UNIQUE PROBLEMS
Pandemic planning efforts must incorporate local health departments and first responders in
plan development.
While states have legal jurisdiction to oversee much of a pandemic plan’s contents, local
responders will be responsible for the related operational, on-the-ground implementation.
Surge capacity, antiviral prioritization, and outbreak tracking are among the areas especially
critical to plan for in the local context. Additionally, a highly-dense urban area poses a particular danger because of the possibility of massive virus transmission.
Local areas, in coordination with state and federal officials, need to prioritize pandemic preparations to ensure that implementation and first response is as seamless and effective as possible.

“

”

WE HAVE TO PLAN FOR THE WORST-CASE EVENT

– Dr. Jean Taylor, head of Maryland pandemic-planning efforts, Maryland Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene.35
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Vaccine and Antiviral Medication Issues
National planners must focus on questions
surrounding stockpiling antivirals and stabilizing vaccine development to protect people in
the event of an outbreak. This is problematic

given the limited production capacity for
antivirals and vaccines in the U.S. and
throughout the world.36

THE SHRINKING VACCINE MANUFACTURING MARKET
In 1976, 37 U.S. companies manufactured vaccines. In 2002, there were only three.
Reasons given for the decline are mostly economic:
I Vaccine production can take decades of research and development and, according to
industry estimates, costs about $800 million per licensed vaccine.
I Concerns about liability impact manufacturers’ decisions to avoid vaccine production,
especially after the significant compensation claims that followed the swine flu immunization program in the mid-1970s.
I Some companies also cite insufficient market size as reason to stay out of the vaccine market,
due to the current low incidence of many diseases in the U.S., such as tuberculosis. The flu vaccine demand is particularly seen as unstable due to the unpredictability of the size and scope of
the market each year.
I There are only two manufacturers currently licensed to produce influenza vaccines in the
U.S., and a third overseas manufacturer who supplies vaccine to the U.S. One of the U.S.licensed manufacturers produces inactivated influenza vaccine and one manufacturer produces the live, attenuated vaccine administered through nasal spray.37

Flu Vaccine Crisis of 2004
The October 2004 announcement that approximately half of the expected flu vaccine for the U.S. would not be available heightened public awareness about the
fragility of the public health system’s vaccine development system and national readiness for a fast-moving influenza epidemic.
In early October, Chiron Corporation announced it would not be able to meet
demand for its flu vaccine after problems at a British plant halted production of millions of doses. The dose shortage highlighted the fact that the U.S. relies on very
few manufacturers to deliver the country’s “projected need of 100 million doses.”38
As a result, CDC officials were forced to encourage changes in the nation’s distribution procedures for the flu vaccine supply, reserving doses only for the populations
most in need. This illustrates the lack of coordination for the prioritization and distribution of vaccines, particularly in a crisis.
The shortage resulted in a focus of media and public attention on the issue, long lines
at health clinics around the country, and calls for incentives, liability reforms, and
other measures to encourage a broader range of vaccine producers.
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OUTDATED TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING FLU VACCINE
Flu vaccines similar to those currently in use were first introduced during the 1940s. Since
then, scientists have improved the standardization and purity of the process. However, the
world remains dependent on the same basic technology that relies on inoculating the current influenza virus strains into embryonated hens’ eggs for vaccine production.39
The influenza vaccine available each year is carefully engineered to respond to particular
strains of the flu judged most likely to emerge based on projections and the genetic composition of prior outbreaks. However, the creation of a vaccine to combat a particular flu
season is an annual “best guess” by virologists. It takes approximately six to nine months
to develop yearly seasonal flu vaccines or vaccines for new strains of the disease.
Therefore, employing the currently used technology, there will be a lag time of at least six
to nine months before a vaccine will be available after a pandemic outbreak strikes.
There are new technologies being developed to produce flu vaccine, which involve cell cultures, recombinant protein, and DNA-based approaches. They may help produce influenza vaccine more efficiently and provide more adaptability to unexpected problems or losses in production. The U.S. government has invested approximately $150 million over the
last two years to stimulate development of these new technologies.40 However, this technology will not be available for use in the immediate future, including within the timeframe
that most experts predict a pandemic outbreak will occur.
In the meantime, the federal government has invested $41 million to expand and maintain
the chicken flocks used by Sanofi Pasteur, the only company that has a U.S.-based influenza vaccine production facility. The goal of the investment is to ensure that flocks can produce eggs year-round.
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STOPGAP ANTIVIRAL MEASURES ARE POSSIBLE TO PROTECT
PEOPLE IN THE SIX TO NINE MONTHS OR MORE IT WOULD TAKE
TO DEVELOP A VACCINE FOR A NEW, LETHAL FLU VIRUS STRAIN
In February 2005, WHO released a report recommending that nations around the world
stockpile antiviral medication to protect against
the current lethal avian strain of the flu. The
WHO has recommended this as a “stopgap”
measure, since it would likely take a minimum
of six months to develop a vaccine after a widespread outbreak. Therefore, antiviral stockpiling would be an essential interim step to have a
way to protect people if a pandemic outbreak
spread before a vaccine was developed. While
health experts expect a pandemic will occur
soon, there is no way to forecast the exact timing. The quantities of both the antiviral medication and a vaccine, once one becomes available, would be limited and countries around
the world would all be seeking supplies.

Several other countries have already ordered
enough Tamiflu to protect between 20-25
percent of their populations in case of an outbreak. The U.S. is already behind in the
queue to place an order for the medication,
for which there is a single manufacturer
worldwide -- Roche Pharmaceutical, which
is located in Switzerland. In testimony before
the U.S. House of Representatives Health
Subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce
Committee, the medical director for Tamiflu
of the Roche company explained that historically they have not produced the levels of
Tamiflu required for global stockpiling. To
help accommodate the growing concerns and
orders, they have increased production of the
antiviral nearly eight-fold since 2003.42

An antiviral medication, oseltamivir, commonly known as Tamiflu, exists that could help alleviate symptoms of those who contract the
pandemic flu and reduce mortality levels. It
can also be used as prophylaxis, or preventive
treatment, to help protect emergency firstresponders and front-line health care workers.

On March 1, 2005, the British government
announced that it was taking steps to procure
14.6 million courses of Tamiflu.43 This procurement would cover 25 percent of the
British population, the rate WHO has recommended.

The WHO estimates that a pandemic flu outbreak could impact approximately 25 percent
of the population in nations worldwide.
Unfortunately, there is limited production
capacity for this vital medication.
The U.S. federal government reportedly has
ordered 5.3 million courses of Tamiflu for the
Strategic National Stockpile, however it would
require approximately 70 million courses to
cover 25 percent of the U.S. population.41

Given the current and projected production
capacity, if the U.S. did place a large order for
Tamiflu, Roche has testified before Congress
that it could be the end of 2007 before they
could deliver enough to the national stockpile
for 25 percent of the population. Thus, antiviral treatment will only be an effective part of
the U.S. response if a pandemic does not occur
for several years and, of course, if the pandemic strain is responsive to antiviral medications.

“Roche has received and is filing on schedule, pandemic stockpile order for Tamiflu from 25 countries
worldwide. Discussions are underway for the U.S. government to purchase significantly greater
amounts of Tamiflu. However, HHS stockpile purchases to date are sufficient to treat less than one
percent of the U.S. population. We have also received a non-binding letter of intent for HHS to
purchase additional treatments to cover under 2 percent of the population.
In contrast, countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Finland, Norway, Switzerland, and
New Zealand are ordering enough Tamiflu to cover between 20 and 40 percent of their populations.
Unfortunately, given the complexities I have described and the increasing global demand, any
government that does not stockpile sufficient quantities of Tamiflu in advance cannot be assured of
an adequate supply at the outbreak of an influenza pandemic.”44
– Dr. Dominick Iacuzio, Medical Director for Tamiflu at Roche in testimony before the
U.S. House of Representatives Health Subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce
Committee on May 26, 2005.
12

STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE AND ONGOING
ANTIVIRAL CONCERNS
Tamiflu and other antiviral medications have shelf life considerations. The FDA has currently approved a five year shelf life for Tamiflu. In the event that a pandemic does not
occur within the five year window for use of the stockpiled reserve of the drug, the U.S.
and other countries can still make use of the Tamiflu they have ordered for use against
annual regular flu concerns before it expires.
Shelf life concerns of antiviral medications, that are part of the Strategic National Stockpile,
however, need to be taken into consideration. Budgeting to replace the reserve of medications that have been determined to be essential to protecting Americans in the event of
emergencies need to be factored into ongoing homeland and health security discussions.

“

THE NEXT PANDEMIC IS IMMINENT ... (AND WE) ... ARE NOT PREPARED.

VACCINE AVAILABILITY IS NOT SECURED. ANTIVIRAL STOCKS DO NOT EXIST AND
WILL NOT BE UNDER THE CURRENT MARKET FORCES. IN THE EVENT OF A PANDEMIC
MILLIONS OF PEOPLE COULD DIE, ECONOMIES COULD BE AFFECTED AND MEDICAL
AND CIVIL SERVICES COULD COLLAPSE. MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC WILL NOT EXCUSE
AUTHORITIES, WHO WILL BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR NOT HAVING PUT IN PLACE
UP-TO-DATE PREPAREDNESS.45

”

– The European Commission, November 27, 2001
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NEW CONCERN: BIRDS
TO PIGS TO HUMANS?
According to a May 2005
edition of Nature Magazine,
scientists are increasingly
concerned that a “dangerous
strain” of the avian flu virus
may be growing in pigs in
Indonesia.46 Pigs are known
to serve as a “mixing vessel”
that incubate strains of disease that become more easily transmissible to humans.47

U.S. Versus the World?
U.S. planning and preparedness for a pandemic lags behind a number of other countries. Below
is a comparison of the U.S. versus the U.K. and Canadian efforts across a number of dimensions.
While the preparations in the U.K. and Canada compare favorably to the U.S., some public health
experts still raise concerns about the degree of implementation-readiness in their efforts.

Leadership

SOUTHEAST ASIA’S
CONTAINMENT CAPACITY
Southeast Asia, the epicenter of the avian influenza
outbreak, has a poor capacity to contain a pandemic if
one should emerge. A pandemic would overwhelm the
capabilities of local Asian
health departments. With
their insufficient capacity
and technology, much of
Southeast Asia’s ability to
detect and monitor the outbreak is severely limited. As
a result, the U.S. must also
decide how it will assist the
world community in responding to the threat -- and
prepare for the worst.
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US

UK

Canada

No government-wide coordination mechanism in place;
Secretary of HHS receives
daily briefings; within HHS
divided authority between
pandemic preparedness
(Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Health) and
pandemic response (Office
of the Assistant Secretary for
Emergency Preparedness).

Cabinet-level office coordinates government-wide and
“civil society” efforts.

Pandemic Influenza
Committee co-chaired by
federal government and
provincial representative to
coordinate national efforts.

Department of Health leads
public health and National
Health Service response.
Similar plans adopted and
coordinated with Scotland,
Wales, and Northern Ireland.

Guidance provided to states
for planning purposes; no
release or systematic review
of local plans.
Planning

Draft plan released August
2004 for public comment;
no timeline for finalized plan.

Plan effective
March 2005

Plan effective
February 2004

Vaccine Development

NIH-funded research on
pandemic vaccine; initial
contracts for building
potential vaccine stockpile.

Research being conducted
on potential vaccines.

Canadian government has
contracted for reserve
production capacity for a
pandemic vaccine with a
Canadian manufacturing
facility.

Significant portion of US
vaccine supply manufactured
abroad.

Prototype “dossier” for regulatory approval of pandemic
vaccine in development.
Discussions with manufacturers regarding optimizing
capacity.
Most UK vaccine production
occurs in the UK.

Vaccine Planning

HHS soliciting public comment
on prioritization for receipt of
limited supply of vaccine.

Priority groups for vaccination identified in plan.

Priority groups for vaccination identified in plan.

Antiviral Planning

5.3 million courses of antiviral ordered for stockpile
(two percent of population).

Courses to cover 25 percent of the U.K. population
have been ordered.

Courses ordered to
cover three percent of
the Canadian population.

HHS soliciting public comment on prioritization for
distribution of limited supply.

Priority groups for antiviral
treatment identified.

Priority groups for antiviral treatment identified.

Health Care System
Surge Capacity
Planning

Planning guidance provided
for health care system.

U.K. has integrated health
care system through National
Health Service and local
Primary Care Trusts, under
direct leadership of U.K.
Department of Health

Checklist of activities
issued for surge capacity
preparation.

Communications
Planning

Outline of steps to prepare
communications tools and
mechanisms.

Specific professional
(provider), public and media
communications messages
and activities identified by
stage of pandemic.

Checklist of activities by
stage of pandemic issued.

Recommendations

“

U.S. PANDEMIC READINESS WILL DEPEND ON IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM

”

STRATEGIES AS WELL AS DEDICATED, INFORMED FEDERAL LEADERSHIP.

– Congressman Jerry Lewis (R-CA), Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of
the U.S. House of Representatives

“

THERE IS A TIME IN THE LIFE OF EVERY PROBLEM WHEN IT IS BIG ENOUGH TO SEE
AND SMALL ENOUGH TO SOLVE. FOR FLU PREPAREDNESS, THAT TIME IS NOW.48

”

– U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt, May 16, 2005

O

verall, U.S. pandemic preparedness is inadequate. Both the federal
pandemic plan and various state pandemic plans are insufficient blue-

prints for an effective national response to a pandemic influenza.
How prepared the U.S. and the rest of the
world are to respond to and control a pandemic will be determined by how much time
remains until an outbreak occurs.
Preparations must be considered without
knowing this exact timeframe. Scientists predict it could happen as soon as this year, or it
could take several years. Therefore, planning and policies must consider what would
need to be done if an outbreak occurred very
soon or with longer lead time to prepare.
I Crucial immediate steps that must be
taken to minimize loss if a pandemic
occurs in the near term include outbreak
tracking, stockpiling medical supplies,
and communications plans.
I Intermediate steps that must be considered if a pandemic occurs with several years
to prepare include stockpiling antivirals and
developing additional surge capacity plans
for hospitals and other medical providers.
I Longer-range steps that should be
undertaken if there are a number of years
to prepare include increasing vaccine
production and the development of new
technologies for vaccines.

Whether a pandemic emerges from the
H5N1 virus or a different strain, the challenge remains constant. Responding quickly and effectively to a pandemic requires a
comprehensive national plan integrated
with state and local-based emergency planning efforts. Though wider national attention and a general acknowledgement of the
virus’s danger are important developments,
specific U.S. pandemic planning efforts are
in need of immediate attention. A review of
both the federal pandemic plan and state
pandemic plans found that many important
planning topics remain under-addressed.
Shoring up these weaknesses should be the
highest of government priorities. In the
interim, every effort should be made by the
federal government to procure the antivirals as a stopgap measure.
To move towards operational plans capable
of wider integration and implementation,
and as a first step towards a strong, cohesive,
and rapid-preparation U.S. pandemic flu
strategy, TFAH recommends the following
activities be addressed in federal, state, and
local preparedness efforts:
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I Define Roles and Responsibilities
A clearly-defined organizational structure and
chain of command is essential for rapid and
efficient control and response, both in the federal government and at the state level. At the
federal level, the President should designate a
single senior official whose primary responsibility is to assure Cabinet-level coordination of
the federal government’s response to a pandemic and also to ensure coordination
between civil society (non-governmental economic infrastructure) and government during a pandemic. Immediate planning should
be occurring at the federal level to minimize
disruption of the health care system and the
overall economy. CDC must review and
approve of state pandemic plans to ensure
nationwide preparedness standards and
regional coordination. States must define and
agree upon leadership roles and responsibilities with respect to who is in charge of a state’s
public health and health care decisions. Plans
must also designate liaisons to work with other
jurisdictions and federal officials.
I Outbreak Tracking
Plans should ensure adequate laboratory surveillance of influenza, including the ability to
isolate and subtype influenza viruses yearround. Following federal guidelines outlined
by HHS, states should report all necessary data
and information to federal and other health
officials as soon as it becomes available.
Congress should provide additional support
for CDC’s global surveillance activities, and
the U.S. should support the WHO’s surveillance program to assure as early a warning as
possible for U.S. preparedness purposes.
I Vaccine Research, Development,
and Production
The U.S. should continue to support and
expand research into new technologies for
influenza vaccine and clinical trials for
potential avian flu and other pandemic vaccines. While the U.S. has issued limited contracts for stockpiling a potential pandemic
vaccine, the federal government should also
explore the Canadian approach of contract16

ing for a reserve production capacity located
in the U.S. A vaccine stockpiling approach is
successful if public health authorities have
guessed correctly on what the pandemic
strain will be. A reserve production capacity
can assure quick turnaround for production
of a vaccine for the actual pandemic strain.
Prior to production, the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) must approve a
new vaccine. Other nations are putting protocols in place now with respect to creating
a rapid review process for a pandemic flu
vaccine. With clear advance notice of the
scientific data that will be required for
approval from regulatory agencies, vaccine
manufactures can better anticipate how to
comply. For example, regulators in the U.K.
are already working with vaccine manufactures to develop a model application for
approval of a pandemic vaccine, which they
estimate could reduce production time by as
much as two months. The U.S. FDA should
adopt a similar strategy.
I Procure Additional Antivirals
for Treatment
Even during a pandemic, when efforts to
contain transmission may seem futile, there
exists a capacity to treat infected individuals.
While the ultimate effectiveness of treatment
depends on the particular strain, Tamiflu
may be an effective treatment option while
scientists work on the development of a vaccine. Furthermore, Tamiflu can be used
prophylactically to protect hospital and
health care workers on the front lines.
The recently enacted emergency supplemental appropriations legislation made available
$58 million for the purchase of influenza
countermeasures for the Strategic National
Stockpile, including, but not limited to, antiviral medications and vaccines. These funds
are most welcome, but TFAH believes that
Congress should provide additional funds
during the FY 2006 appropriations cycle to
continue to build the nation’s antiviral stockpiles from the current level of two percent of
the U.S. population to cover a higher percentage of the population.

I Mass Vaccination and Treatment Systems
The federal government, in coordination
with the states, must develop systems for
tracking and distributing antiviral medication and vaccines. A national system is needed to assure targeted and/or equitable distribution of supply, so we do not have a repeat
of the 2004-2005 flu season distribution problems. State-level systems also are needed to
assure similar availability across a state. One
of the best ways to improve vaccination
preparations for a pandemic outbreak may
be to enhance annual flu vaccination coverage for non-traditional high-risk groups (e.g.
individuals with chronic diseases or compromised immune systems) to facilitate access to
these populations during a pandemic.
I Prioritize Who Would Receive Antivirals
and Vaccines Based on Limited Supplies
It is important to determine a protocol for
allocation among high priority populations,
such as health care workers, prior to an outbreak. The federal government should provide specific guidance to states as to which
sectors of the population should receive
antiviral medications and vaccines, and in
what order, particularly since the amount of
available pharmaceuticals will be limited.
I Public Information Campaigns
and Materials
Communicating with the public in a clear
and efficient manner is essential during a
high-anxiety time. The federal government,
in conjunction with the states, should develop coordinated messages for various audiences (media, public, providers, etc.) for
each stage of a potential pandemic. States
must identify and train spokespersons in
multiple languages and educate public
health officials, politicians, community leaders, partners, and the media about what
information will and will not be available
during a pandemic. States should ensure
clear and consistent messaging by creating
information templates in multiple languages ready for customization and distribution during a pandemic.

I Stockpile Medical and Safety
Equipment for Health Care Workers
and First Responders
Efforts must be undertaken to ensure that
basic medical and safety equipment will be
available for health care workers and emergency responders in the event of a major
outbreak. Currently, most health providers
order and stock supplies on a “just-in-time”
basis. This means they often only have a few
days of reserve supplies, equipment, and
medicines, including many basic protective
items, such as masks, gloves, gowns, and
clean hospital linens. In order to prepare
for a mass event, steps must be taken immediately to stockpile additional supplies, particularly since during an outbreak, many
production and delivery systems for supplies
will likely be stalled or even stopped.
I Surge Capacity Capabilities
Plans must account for the likelihood that
hospitals will be quickly overwhelmed during a pandemic, by developing auxiliary
sites such as shelters, schools, nursing
homes, hotels, and daycare centers for surge
capacity treatment and for treatment of the
“walking well.” States should be conducting
surveys of potential sites and obtaining
agreements. Cooperation and integration
with local health officials and first responders is essential.
I Secure a Backup Workforce
States should conduct and maintain an
inventory of healthcare professional residents, including current and retired doctors,
nurses, veterinarians, emergency medical
staff, and other potential volunteers. These
workers could be an essential expanded
workforce during a pandemic. Pandemic
survivors are also a population of potential
workers. States should plan for tracking and
soliciting volunteer support from this population, which is presumably immune to the
virus. Planning efforts should also incorporate private sector support whenever possible, especially in infrastructure and nonhealth service provider capacities.
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I Ensure Availability of Food, Water, and
Other Supplies
States must account for high demand for
food, water, and other basic supplies, and
plan for distribution to general and hard-toreach populations. Plans should factor in
potential complications of infected food and
delivery workers, possible infected store facilities, and limitations on public interaction
both for those infected and the general population at risk of exposure. Planners must
also weigh the issue of “just-in-time” manufacturing of food and supplies, since reserves
of supplies will not be available. Additionally,
planners must address the limitations of
medical equipment manufacturing, much of
which Asia exports to the world.

I Measures to Manage Mass Death
Planning for worst-case scenarios is a critical
component of effective planning. States
must conduct and maintain an inventory of
facilities with sufficient refrigerated storage
to serve as temporary morgues in the event
of a pandemic.
As indicated, there are several concrete
steps that the U.S. can take to better prepare
against an influenza pandemic. Such policies and investments will help stabilize the
nation’s health and economy in the event of
a pandemic while ensuring that pandemic
readiness preparations are “commensurate
with the scale of the threat we face.”49

I Quarantine Measures and Authority to
Close Public Places
States must establish clear legal authority
and emergency measures to effectively contain the spread of disease. States must have
powers to prohibit public gatherings, close
public facilities and schools, and restrict
travel, if necessary.
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Appendix A: State-by-State Range of Potential Pandemic Influenza
Deaths and Hospitalizations*
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
TOTALS

Projected Dead
25% contraction,
25% contraction,
lower severity
high severity
flu deaths
flu deaths
2,962
17,771
295
1,771
3,074
18,446
1,783
10,700
20,292
121,750
2,397
14,383
2,351
14,107
502
3,014
385
2,310
11,912
71,474
4,552
27,309
815
4,892
760
4,558
7,907
47,439
3,939
23,634
2,078
12,465
1,791
10,746
2,643
15,859
2,778
16,668
884
5,302
3,319
19,916
4,379
26,271
6,541
39,244
3,101
18,608
1,787
10,723
3,758
22,548
601
3,608
1,147
6,882
1,081
6,486
778
4,665
5,660
33,960
1,081
6,488
12,567
75,401
4,996
29,973
457
2,742
7,732
46,393
2,278
13,666
2,241
13,447
9,062
54,369
745
4,467
2,491
14,947
520
3,118
3,625
21,750
11,708
70,247
1,131
6,786
395
2,369
4,368
26,207
3,637
21,820
1,350
8,097
3,540
21,240
305
1,830
180,478
1,082,866

Projected Hospitalized
25% contraction,
25% contraction,
lower severity
high severity
hospitalizations
hospitalizations
12,863
77,178
1,519
9,114
13,225
79,350
7,553
45,318
91,030
546,180
10,993
65,958
9,978
59,868
2,187
13,122
1,658
9,948
47,462
284,772
20,970
125,820
3,524
21,144
3,385
20,310
34,579
207,474
17,237
103,422
8,697
52,182
7,648
45,888
11,583
69,498
12,383
74,298
3,778
22,668
14,833
88,998
18,679
112,074
28,668
172,008
13,596
81,576
7,844
47,064
16,080
96,480
2,595
15,570
4,899
29,394
4,819
28,914
3,434
20,604
24,264
145,584
4,835
29,010
54,163
324,978
21,880
131,280
1,931
11,586
33,326
199,956
9,792
58,752
9,682
58,092
37,553
225,318
3,087
18,522
10,995
65,970
2,199
13,194
15,893
95,358
53,550
321,300
5,302
31,812
1,738
10,428
19,624
117,744
16,204
97,224
5,671
34,026
15,281
91,686
1,363
8,178
786,032
4,716,192

* Projections based on CDC’s FluAid 2.0 program. The estimated deaths and hospitalizations assume the
following: The projections range from the most likely number of deaths and hospitalizations at a 25%
rate of contraction for a relatively mild pandemic, similar to the 1968 pandemic, to the most likely number of deaths and hospitalizations for a more severe pandemic, similar to the 1918 pandemic.
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